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FOR ARTICLE III JUDGES REQUIRE
A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT?
DAVID R. DOW & SANAT MEHTA*
ABSTRACT
Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of legal academicians from
across the political spectrum proposed eliminating life tenure for some
or all Article III judges and replacing it with a term of years (or a set of
renewable terms). These scholars were largely in agreement such a
change could be accomplished only by a formal constitutional
amendment of Article III. In this Article, Dow and Mehta agree with the
desirability of doing away with life tenure but argue such a change can
be accomplished by ordinary legislation, without the need for formal
amendment. Drawing on both originalism and formalism, Dow and
Mehta begin by observing that the constitutional text does not expressly
provide for lifetime tenure; rather, it states that judges shall hold their
office during good behavior. The good behavior criterion, however, was
not intended to create judicial sinecures for 20 or 30 years, but instead
aimed at safeguarding judicial independence from the political branches.
By measuring both the length of judicial tenure among Supreme Court
justices, as well as voting behavior on the Supreme Court, Dow and
Mehta conclude that, in fact, life tenure has proven inconsistent with
judicial independence. They maintain that the Framers’ objective of
insuring judicial independence is best achieved by term limits for
Supreme Court justices.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides, “The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior.”1 The constitutional text does not explicitly provide
that Article III judges, once confirmed, shall hold their positions until
death (or retirement), yet this “good behavior” clause has been
understood for many years to provide life tenure to Article III judges.2
We therefore refer to the good behavior clause in this essay as the life
tenure provision. We undertake an originalist inquiry, revisiting the late
eighteenth-century context in which this constitutional language was
adopted to determine whether the Founders intended for judges to
serve for “life.” We then ask whether changed historical circumstances
mean that the good behavior clause no longer necessitates life tenure.

1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 70–133 (1974)
(exploring how the entitlement of a judge to his position during good behavior originated as a
limit on the power of the king to remove judges at will). The conventional view, of course, is that
good behavior implies (or compels) life tenure. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith,
How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 90 (2006) (concluding “by the end of the
eighteenth century, a simple grant of good-behavior tenure might also be considered ‘tenure for
life’ or ‘life tenure’”). Yet, despite the near universal acceptance of this proposition, a somewhat
different historical analysis suggests a distinction between good behavior and life tenure. See
Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory
Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of ‘During Good Behavior,’ 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 456 (1967) (arguing that grants of office for “life tenure” were different
from grants during good behavior). For a critical response to the Kramer-Barron analysis, see
generally Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and Good Behavior Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475
(1970) (analyzing and critiquing said analysis). For purposes of our argument in this essay, we
accept Berger’s position that the good behavior clause is best read as a life tenure provision.
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For more than two decades, a variety of judges and legal
academicians from across the political spectrum have proposed
eliminating life tenure for some, if not all, Article III judges.3 While the
substance, breadth, and rationale for these suggestions have varied,
there is a rare consensus among those who oppose life tenure that
replacing it would require a constitutional amendment.4 By looking to
both the founding era documents as well as data from the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, we test the soundness of that
consensus and ask whether eliminating or modifying the life tenure
provision would require a constitutional amendment, or whether this
change could instead be achieved through ordinary legislation.5 In
short, if there is a coherent originalist understanding of the good
behavior clause that does not compel life tenure, then Congress could
statutorily enact term limits for Article III judges.
We proceed as follows: In Part I, we briefly explain how an
originalist reading of Article III would permit Congress to eliminate
life tenure by statute, focusing specifically on Supreme Court justices.
In Part II, we elaborate and update two pieces of historical data. The
3. For an overview of some recent proposals, see Kalvis Golde, Experts Tout Proposals for
Supreme Court Term Limits, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2020/08/experts-tout-proposals-for-supreme-court-term-limits/. Perhaps the academician most
associated with these ideas is Steven Calabresi, who has been a leading proponent of doing away
with life tenure for many years. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for
the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 822–42 (2006);
see also Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. POST
(Aug. 9, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ opinions/2002/08/09/term-limits-forthe-high-court/646134cd-8e13-4166-9474-5f53be633d7c/.
Of course, in the face of these many proposals, there have also been important defenses of life
tenure. See, e.g., David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1397,
1421–25 (2005) (making the case for life tenure); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical
Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi and Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 791, 814–21 (2007) (responding specifically to the data and analysis relied on by Calabresi
and Lindgren).
For a nuanced overview of the various proposals, see Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and
Return to Practice, 60 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 841, 844 n.9 (2011) (citing and summarizing most
prominent criticisms and defenses of life tenure).
4. But see Judith Resnick, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
579, 614–19 (2005) (suggesting, inter alia, the Supreme Court could read Article III to provide for
fixed judicial terms).
5. Our interest in examining this commonplace view, that change cannot occur in the
absence of a constitutional amendment, is that we agree with those who believe life tenure for
Supreme Court justices is undesirable. Yet we are also aware of the difficulty of formally
amending the Constitution. Many of the proponents of eliminating life tenure have limited their
focus to Supreme Court justices. In part, this focus results from the unique power of the Supreme
Court to overturn precedent, and, in part, it results from the bureaucratic and administrative
challenges of having life tenure for all of the nearly 800 federal judges. In our discussion here, we
likewise limit our focus to Supreme Court justices.
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first pertains to the length of judicial tenure in different historical eras;
the second pertains to political polarization on the Supreme Court. To
our knowledge, we are the first to report on this metric for measuring
polarization, and we suggest it may supply important data for assessing
whether the Framers had intended for Supreme Court justices to serve
for as long as they currently do. Finally, in Part III, we provide an answer
to whether the historical record supports the originalist reading we
outline in Part I.
I. THE ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST LIFE TENURE
Originalists interpret constitutional provisions consistent with the
way they believe the Framers themselves had understood those
provisions.6 Given this simple definition, we can, for heuristic purposes,
divide the universe of constitutional propositions into two groups:
those which technological or scientific advances have made applying
originalism to these issues either challenging or plainly impossible, and
those for which technological or scientific advances have not impacted
the originalist enterprise. The first group exhibits dynamic originalist
meaning; the latter are characterized by stable originalist meaning.
For example, suppose law enforcement authorities, in a car across
the street, monitor a house where they suspect marijuana is being
illegally grown. From the street, they use heat map sensors to determine
whether there is in fact marijuana inside the house. Obviously, the
Framers could not have fathomed such technology, which means the
Framers could not have conceptualized precisely how the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unlawful searches and seizures would

6. The literature on originalism is obviously vast, and this footnote is by no means an
attempt to provide a comprehensive bibliography. However, a useful (if now somewhat dated)
analysis can be found in Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). A clear and
incisive examination of originalism as an interpretive method is represented by Lawrence B.
Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 147 (2012) (discussing the contemporary theoretical development of the method
articulated by Jack Balkin). See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
The outline of the argument we propose in Part III, infra, is a version of what Paul Brest
characterized as strict intentionalism. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204, 209–17 (1980). Of course, as Dan Farber has demonstrated,
intentionalists can disagree among themselves—a fact that some take as casting grave doubt on
the very enterprise. See Daniel F. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1100–02 (1989) (discussing this aforementioned disagreement). In this essay,
we do not aspire to engage in this debate but simply identify one possible version of originalism
and its impact on interpreting the good behavior clause. And although we explore where an
originalist understanding of the life tenure provision would lead, we do not necessarily endorse
originalism as either a sound or superior or even coherent interpretive approach.

DOW & MEHTA_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/17/2021 6:41 PM

ARTICLE III LIFE TENURE & CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

93

have applied to this scenario.7 Similarly, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to have a warranted view of whether the Framers would conclude a
police officer’s search of a cell phone confiscated from a subject who
fled a traffic stop represents a violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment.8 In certain respects, therefore, both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments require dynamic originalist interpretation.
Instances calling for dynamic originalism are not limited to the
context of criminal procedure. Whether a prohibition against sex or
gender discrimination applies to an individual who has had sex
reassignment surgery cannot generate a coherent originalist answer.9
Nor can it in the abortion context:10 determining when the
government’s interest in the welfare of a fetus becomes sufficient to
outweigh the mother’s own liberty interest in controlling her body is in
part a function of the ability of technology to sustain a prematurely
delivered baby. The nature of science makes this, of course, a dynamic
matter.11
7. The case, of course, is Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), and the literature
addressing the case, and the originalist analysis in particular, is vast. For a sample, see, e.g., David
E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 60–66 (2005); Ric
Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 545–47 (2007). We
recognize, of course, that the word “precisely” in the text is doing a great deal of work here, but
that adverb does not dilute the challenge facing an originalist approach to this scenario.
Specifically, an originalist answer to the question generated here demands the use of analogy,
rather than merely asking what the Framers themselves believed, and whether analogical
reasoning is sound originalism is a subject of some controversy. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, The
Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647, 649, 654–55 (1985);
Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Property, Privacy, and Justice Gorsuch’s Expansive Fourth Amendment
Originalism, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425, 439, 446 (2020) (addressing Gorsuch’s use of
analogical reasoning in an interpretive methodology he refers to as originalist).
8. Several cases are illustrative, including Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). For
valuable analysis, see, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Cops and Cars: How the Automobile Drove Fourth
Amendment Law, 99 B. U. L. REV. 2317, 2324–27 (2019) (discussing SARAH A. SEO, POLICING
THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM (2019)).
9. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741–42 (2020) (holding Title VII
prohibition against sex discrimination includes termination on account of sexual orientation or
transgender status).
10. Despite being widely criticized for its methodology, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
was in fact an originalist tour de force, which sought to examine history to ascertain the moment
at which the government’s interest in prohibiting or regulating abortion superseded a woman’s
liberty interest in controlling her body. Under Roe, therefore, the abortion right was stable. But
the replacement of the Roe trimester framework with the undue burden test articulated in Casey
makes the right to obtain an abortion dynamic. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (laying out the undue burden framework).
11. The examples are legion and applicable in some cases even where unexpected. For
example, the enumeration clause in U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 23, cl. 3, calling for an “actual
enumeration,” would be more precisely implemented by statistical sampling methods unknown
to the Framers, yet the use of such techniques has been deemed unconstitutional. See U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 317 (1999). This decision has been
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Yet there are many other constitutional provisions whose
understanding is unaffected by scientific or technological change; these
provisions exemplify stable originalist meaning. For example, the
meaning of “the Age of twenty-five Years,” the minimum necessary for
someone to be eligible to serve in the House of Representatives,12 is
unaffected by scientific technological advance. The same is true for the
meaning of “the Legislature of three fourths of the several States,” the
fraction needed for ratification of a constitutional amendment.13 Those
discrete requirements remain unchanged over time.
What is notable about the life tenure guarantee, however, is that it
is a chimera of both stable and dynamic character. While the meaning
of “life” is stable, the meaning of good behavior is not (or is not
necessarily so). Moreover, the Framers could have provided explicitly
for judges’ life tenure and made that tenure subject to removal only in
the absence of good behavior (just as the President is subject to
removal for commission of high crimes or misdemeanors). But, of
course, they did not. Therefore, the translation of the good behavior
clause into a life tenure provision may be inconsistent with original
understanding.
Say, for example, the historical record supports the conclusion the
Framers understood the good behavior clause to mean that judges
would serve for fifteen (or twenty or even twenty-five) years. If it
happens that today, judges are serving for thirty (or thirty-five or even
forty) years—far longer than their predecessors—then the originalist
understanding of the good behavior clause may not dictate that
contemporary judges are guaranteed life tenure. Similarly, if the
Framers believed that turnover among justices would be sufficiently
regular as to neutralize ideological polarization, but turnover no longer
happens at a rate adequate to accomplish that goal, then there is
another originalist argument for decoupling the good behavior clause
from the life tenure guarantee. Likewise, if the purpose of the good
behavior clause was to ensure judicial independence, and if in fact life
defended on originalist grounds by several commentators. See generally, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, The
Original Understanding of the Census Clause, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2002). For the argument that
the sampling techniques challenged in Department of Commerce were unknown to the Framers
because they had yet to be invented, see generally David B. Goldin, Number Wars, 32 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1 (2000). In any event, our aim in this part of the essay is not to place every constitutional
clause in one category or the other, but simply to show that these two different categories of
constitutional provisions provides analytic value in an assessment of whether originalism can
generate a coherent answer to a contemporary question.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
13. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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tenure undermines such independence, the conventional assumption
that good behavior grants life tenure may be unsound.
Therefore, to analyze whether the good behavior clause should
continue to be understood as guaranteeing life tenure for Supreme
Court justices, we explore a cluster of issues connected to the original
meaning of “good behavior” itself, as well as whether the Framers were
indifferent to the actual number of years that judges might serve (so
long as they exhibit such behavior). If we identify a significant gap
between how long the Framers expected judges to serve and how long
they actually serve, or if there are other changed historical
circumstances that the Framers did not anticipate when they embraced
the good behavior standard, then, as an originalist matter, the dynamic
“good behavior clause” does not perforce provide life tenure, because
what the Framers had intended life tenure to be was something quite
different from what we see today.
II. WHAT “LIFE” MEANT THEN, WHAT IT MEANS NOW, AND OTHER
CHANGES IN HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS

In an important article, which jump-started discussions of the
merits and demerits of lifetime tenure14 and what to replace it with and
how, Professors Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren identified the
many reasons why lifetime tenure for Supreme Court justices is
undesirable. Conceding that their alternative would require a
constitutional amendment, Calabresi and Lindgren proposed “an
eighteen-year, staggered term limit on the tenure of Supreme Court
Justices . . . [such that] the turnover of Justices would occur during the
first and third year of a President’s four-year term.”15
In their view, a variety of factors counsel against lifetime tenure,
including the increased ideological polarity of the Court and
accompanying ideological nature of confirmation hearings.16 The
central data point Calabresi and Lindgren identify as relevant is the
increase in the number of years served by Supreme Court justices over

14. See generally Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3. The conversation inspired by
Calabresi and Lindgren has persisted for well over a decade now. A noteworthy volume
containing a number of contributions to the debate is REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS
FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2006). For an
argument these reforms do not require a formal amendment, see generally Judith Resnik, Judicial
Selection and Democratic Theory, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005).
15. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 824–25.
16. Id. at 800–09.
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the years. In this essay, we provide further data illuminating this metric:
the mean tenure served by Supreme Court justices.
In addition, we also provide a new metric: how ideological
polarization on the Court has changed over time. To be sure, measuring
polarization is less straightforward than calculating mean tenure, and
there may well be other metrics able to measure polarity beyond the
method we have used. But our metric is particularly useful because it
reveals a positive correlation between longer judicial terms and
ideological polarization—a parallel that supports the proposition that
life tenure, rather than fostering political independence, in fact
accomplishes the opposite. And although the Roberts Court has taken
fewer cases in recent years and decided a larger percentage of those
cases unanimously,17 which ameliorates the trend toward greater
polarization, the trend is nevertheless pronounced over the course of
U.S. history.
Regarding the length of judicial tenure, Calabresi and Lindgren
noted that from 1789 until 1970, the average term served by a Supreme
Court justice was just about fifteen years.18 In contrast, justices who
replaced those who retired since 1970 have served on average 26
years.19 Indeed, because of these much longer terms, Calabresi and
Lindgren noted there were no vacancies on the Court from 1994 until
the middle of 2005.20
To be sure, the Supreme Court is not designed to be a democratic
institution, but its members are appointed and confirmed by
presumably democratic institutions. Consequently, insofar as
excessively long tenures create unanticipated chasms between the
judicial branch and democratic institutions, the judicial branch is even
farther removed from the people than the Framers could have
imagined. It is not evident that the additional distance is desirable, or
that the Framers believed it would be.21 Our data show that, for most
of U.S. history, a Supreme Court justice confirmed during the first term
of a two-term President would serve a number of years that would
17. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100
Cᴏʀɴᴇʟʟ L. REV. 769, 775 (2015); see also Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (May
10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html (discussing the
overall trend towards polarization).
18. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 771.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 26 and 27 (addressing discussions of the good
behavior clause at the constitutional convention).
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permit the following President to nominate a successor during the
following President’s second term. In recent years, however, a justice
confirmed during a President’s first term will serve well through that
President’s tenure—as well as through the next President’s two terms.
Calabresi and Lindgren believe their proposal provides an
alternative superior to the current system, but also believe their
proposal requires a formal constitutional amendment. As we have
indicated, we remain agnostic on the merits of their proposal, but we
have sought to explore whether their alternative, or any alternative, to
life tenure would in fact require a formal amendment. Toward that end,
we have generated a more granular examination of how the concept of
life tenure has changed over U.S. constitutional history and the extent
to which Supreme Court voting has become more polarized.
A. The Data and Our Approach
We have divided U.S. history into eight historical periods. The first,
the Founding era, runs from 1787 until 1810. Next, the Jacksonian era
runs from 1810 to 1840. Third, the Civil War and Reconstruction era
goes from 1840 to 1870. Fourth, the Technological Revolutionary era
runs from 1870 to 1900. Fifth, the World War I era goes from 1900 to
1930. Sixth, the World War II and New Deal era is from 1930 to 1960.
Seventh, the Civil Rights and Space Age era runs from 1960 to 1990.
Eighth and finally, the Internet and Pandemic era is from 1990 to 2020.
The following charts reveal the average age and cumulative tenure of
Supreme Court justices in each historical period.22 To produce the first
graph, we calculated—for each year since the founding—the mean age
of the justices serving that year. For each historical period, we then took
the mean of the yearly means for each year in that period.23 To produce
the second graph, we performed a similar computation, using the total
number of years served (tenure) for each justice currently on the court
in each year, instead of age, as in the first graph.

22. The raw data used to calculate the mean and median years of tenure in each historical
period is contained in the Appendix, which identifies each Supreme Court justice and how long
each served.
23. We count a justice as serving during a particular year even if he or she serves for only
part of that year. For example, Justice Scalia is counted for 2016, Justice Gorsuch is counted for
2017, and both Justice Kennedy and Justice Kavanaugh are counted for 2018.
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The data reveal that, over time, justices have been serving longer
terms and until older ages. The unusually low average tenure for period
1 is because the period began with six justices appointed by President
George Washington to a newly formed Court. Because the Court began
with zero cumulative years of experience, a comparison between period
1 and other periods is inapt; all other periods began with some
incumbent justices. Period 2 saw many longer-serving justices; this
metric then declined for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries. The most recent two periods, however, have seen a sharp
uptick in average tenure: from 9.3 years during the 1930-1960 period to
12.7 years during the 1960-1990 period to 14.4 years during the 19902020 period. This most recent period has seen a higher average tenure
than any of the preceding periods. Recent justices have indeed been
holding their seats longer than their predecessors.
Of course, lengthier terms, standing alone, might be a phenomenon
the Framers did not anticipate, but not a phenomenon necessarily
inconsistent with their objective. However, our second data point,
ideological polarization, reveals how the longer terms served by
Supreme Court justices contravenes the Framers’ intent to create an
independent a judicial branch, one insulated from political pressure.
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We measure ideological polarization by examining the number of
cases decided unanimously (e.g., 9-0 or 8-0) and the number of cases
decided by a one-vote margin (e.g., 5-4) and tied cases (e.g., 4-4) over
time.24 To be sure, not all 5-4 decisions reflect ideological polarization,
and not all 9-0 decisions reflect ideological commonality, but the
trendlines reflecting vote splits may nonetheless be useful.
The first chart shows that, from the Supreme Court’s founding until
1930, over 80 percent of cases were decided unanimously. That figure
dropped significantly as the New Deal era began: In the 1930-1960
period, only about half of cases were decided unanimously, and since
1960, the unanimity rate has hovered around 40 percent.
Even more striking is the second chart, which demonstrates the
sharp rise in cases decided by a one-vote margin (or in which the lower
court judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court). Because the
number of justices has been fixed at nine since 1869, most cases in this
24. We have compiled the raw data on Supreme Court decisions from various databases on
“The Supreme Court Database” website by Washington University Law. The Supreme Court
Database, WASH. UNIV. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last accessed Feb. 21, 2021). These
sources, however, do not provide the votes in cases. To derive the data points, we use a proxy for
ideological polarization, and Mehta wrote a script to extract that information from the source
material. Anyone wishing access to the raw data is invited to contact either of the authors.
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category are 5-4 decisions. Until 1930, fewer than 2 percent of cases
were so closely divided. But this phenomenon has become much more
common in the last 90 years, and since 1990, it has occurred in nearly
one-fifth (18.7 percent) of cases.
B. Key Findings
There are thus two significant differences between the Supreme
Court as it exists in the twenty-first century, and how the Framers likely
envisioned it in the late eighteenth. The first is how long justices serve,
and the second is how ideologically divided they are. These two factors
are mutually reinforcing: Because justices know the Court is
ideologically driven, they will be loath to retire if a consequence of that
retirement is being replaced by an ideological counterweight. And
relatedly, because justices are chosen largely based on their ideological
orientation, they generally continue to vote in accordance with that
orientation for the duration of their ever-lengthening tenure.25
The Framers neither knew of, nor could they have foreseen, such
significant shifts. The originalist question, therefore, is whether either
or both of these developments severs the concept of good behavior
from life tenure.
Good behavior might not exist when justices vote largely along
ideological lines, especially when those ideological lines betray a lack
of independence from the political branches. Alternatively, the good
behavior standard might have been embraced by the Framers on the
premise Supreme Court justices would serve substantially shorter
terms than they presently do. There may be other gambits as well that
can serve to uncouple the good behavior clause from life tenure. If any
of these rationales are persuasive to Congress, then eliminating life
tenure and replacing it with something else, including the CalabresiLindgren proposal, would not require a constitutional amendment
after all.

25. There are of course a handful of counterexamples, including Justice David Souter, who
often voted with the so-called liberal wing of the Court despite being nominated by President
George H.W. Bush and Justice Harry Blackmun, who also often voted with the so-called liberal
wing despite being nominated by President Nixon. These counterexamples, however, serve
largely to prove the rule.
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III. WHAT THE FRAMERS MEANT BY “GOOD BEHAVIOR”
Both today and in the eighteenth century, life ends upon a person’s
death. “Life,” therefore, has stable meaning, but “good behavior” does
not.26 Consequently, if the Framers had expressly provided for life
tenure in Article III, then it would be more difficult to argue that
altering or eliminating life tenure can be achieved by ordinary
legislation. But the Framers did not so provide, so the central question
(for purposes of answering whether life tenure can be done away with
through ordinary legislation) is what the Framers meant by good
behavior, and what they sought to accomplish with that phrase.27
We can rule out the possibility that the Framers used the phrase
“good behavior” as a euphemism for life tenure. Article II provides that
the Vice President shall assume the duties of the presidency in the event

26. Like the meaning of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,” the standard for
removing a President through impeachment, the phrase “good behavior” has no perspicuous
definition. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (addressing removal of President from office), with
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing Article III judges “shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior”). Both phrases can be examined and parsed by reference to the common law, but, as
is often the case, that examination and parsing is non-determinative. Indeed, Gouverneur Morris
conceded the inscrutability of the phrase “good behavior.” See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J. 681, 701 (1979). For an analysis of the phrase “high crimes
and misdemeanors,” see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Defining High Crimes and Misdemeanors,
67 Geo. Wᴀsʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 712 (1999) (discussing the potentially broad context of the phrase). On
constitutional opacity generally on these standards, see generally Bᴇʀɢᴇʀ, supra note 2; William
Bates III, Vagueness in the Constitution: The Impeachment Power, 25 Sᴛᴀɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 908 (1973)
(reviewing Bᴇʀɢᴇʀ, supra note 2 and IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS
(1972)).
We shall refer again to Raoul Berger’s argument that judges can be removed for reasons other
than failing to adhere to good behavior. See Bᴇʀɢᴇʀ, supra note 2. Berger’s argument was
persuasively countered by Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J.
681 (1979).
27. In a sense, the meaning of good behavior was invented in the colonies and the states,
because, at the time the Constitution was drafted, there appear to have been no English judges
who had been removed using this criterion. And, in the U.S., the Congress has treated the phrase
as similar to the high crimes and misdemeanors standard relevant for removing the president or
vice-president. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
According to the Federal Judicial Center, 15 federal judges have been impeached since the
founding. Eight were convicted by the Senate and removed from office; the others resigned or
were acquitted. In 1804, John Pickering, a federal judge in New Hampshire, was removed “on
charges of mental instability and intoxication on the bench.” In 1862, during the Civil War, a
federal judge in Tennessee was removed for “refusing to hold court and waging war against the
U.S. government.” More recently, impeachments and convictions have focused on bribery and
perjury. The only Supreme Court justice to be impeached was Samuel Chase. The House of
Representatives accused him of “arbitrary and oppressive conduct of trials,” but the Senate
acquitted him in 1805. Essentially, he was impeached for allowing his political views to influence
his judicial decision-making, but the Senate viewed this rationale as flimsy. In a sense, therefore,
the absence of a well-understood historical meaning for good behavior has facilitated the collapse
of this standard into life tenure.
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of the President’s “[d]eath, resignation, or [i]nability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office.”28 The Framers were not averse
to identifying death as the end of someone’s term of office.
Hence, the Framers might have written that judges would hold their
office during good behavior, until death. That formulation would have
been redundant, and therefore excluded by ordinary canons of
interpretation, if life tenure is inherent in the good behavior clause. But
it is also possible the Framers intended to limit judicial terms to good
behavior, while also anticipating that judges would not serve for the
duration of their natural lives.
The records from the constitutional convention are not particularly
illuminating, as the Framers spent very little time discussing the good
behavior clause. Indeed, the issue was addressed only briefly on three
separate days.
First, on July 17, 1787, the delegates considered whether to allow the
“Executive Magistrate” to serve during good behavior, like judges. At
this point during the Convention, the delegates were still considering
the Virginia Plan, in which Congress would elect the chief executive for
a 7-year term; the Electoral College idea had not yet been proposed.
James McClurg, of Virginia, proposed replacing the 7-year term with
“good behavior.”29 His stated rationale was that “the independence of
the Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary
department.”30 McClurg’s reasoning suggests that the principal
objective of the good behavior clause was insulation from politicization
or political interference. In this context, such insulation is best
understood to mean that the official (whether an Article III judge or
the president) would exercise her or his best judgment, rather than
merely reflect the will of the populace.31
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
29. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 33 (1911).
30. Id.
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The complete independence of
the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. . . . one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority . . . . Limitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”). See also generally Bert
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing for superiority of Article
III judges over state court judges because of the supposed insulation of federal judges from
political pressures). Indeed, citing Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 76, Professor Emery Lee has
argued the Framers gave the appointment power to the president to insulate the process from
partisanship, not anticipating how the president would, too, become part of partisan strife. Emery
G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on the Senate’s Role
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George Mason, McClurg’s fellow Virginian, opposed McClurg’s
motion, in part because it “[would] be impossible to define the
misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it to a proper trial; and
perhaps still more impossible to compel so high an offender holding his
office by such a tenure to submit to a trial.”32 Importantly, therefore,
Mason did not disagree with McClurg that the overarching goal was to
insulate Article III judges from political influence. Yet his opposition
to McClurg’s proposal does supply the first instance of direct evidence
that some of the Framers viewed good behavior akin to life, for he
argued “an Executive during good behavior as a softer name only for
an Executive for life. And that the next would be an easy step to
hereditary Monarchy.”33 In the end, McClurg’s motion failed.34
Second, on July 20, the delegates discussed whether Congress
should be allowed to impeach the chief executive.35 Rufus King of
Massachusetts was skeptical of allowing such impeachments, because—
unlike judges—the chief executive would serve a limited term.36
According to Madison’s notes, King argued that, unlike the President,
judges would “hold their places not for a limited time, but during good
behaviour.”37 Of course, the delegates eventually did provide for the
impeachment of the President (the chief executive), but King’s
observation that “the Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time,
but during good behaviour” is the second piece of direct evidence
supporting the notion that the Framers equated good behavior with life
service.
Third and finally, on August 27, John Dickinson of Delaware offered
an amendment to permit removal of federal judges for reasons other
than their violation of good behavior.38 He proposed allowing the
President to remove a judge upon request by both houses of
Congress—a proposal that failed miserably.39 Gouverneur Morris of
New York and Edmund Randolph of Virginia both opposed
Dickinson’s proposal, suggesting that making judges reliant on
in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N. L. REV. 235 (2004). See also Republican Party
of Minn. v. White, 736 U.S. 765, 788–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that an unfortunate
consequence of judicial elections is subjecting judges to ordinary political pressures).
32. FARRAND, supra note 29, at 34.
33. Id. at 32–33.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 56–59.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 340.
39. Id. at 335, 340 (noting that Dickinson’s proposal was rejected by a vote of seven to one).
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continued approval of Congress would dilute their independence.40
These statements are less directly supportive of the equivalence
between life tenure and good behavior than King’s or Mason’s, but they
do indicate the Framers’ preeminent focus on safeguarding judicial
independence.
Though the records from the constitutional convention pertaining
to the standard for removing judges are thus rather thin, there is
another source germane to determining the originalist understanding
of good behavior. That source is the practices of the states. And in
adopting the good behavior provision, the Framers largely followed the
states’ lead.41
At the time of the constitutional convention, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, and North Carolina
had all codified the good behavior standard in their state constitutions.
The Massachusetts constitution elaborated:
It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial,
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore,
not only the best policy, but for the security of the rights of the
people, and of every citizen, [that] the judges of the supreme judicial
court should hold their offices as long as they themselves behave
well, and that they should have honorable salaries ascertained and
established by standing laws.42

In contrast, Pennsylvania and New Jersey had established sevenyear terms for their state supreme court justices.43 It may be relevant,
however, that since the founding, life tenure for state judges has fallen
out of favor. Today, only Rhode Island uses the good behavior
standard.44 Massachusetts and New Hampshire provide that state

40. Id. at 340.
41. The states in turn had followed England’s 1701 Act of Settlement. See Michael J. Mazza,
A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 135
(2003–04) (noting that the Act of Settlement provided that judges should serve during “good
behavior (‘quamdiu se bene gesserint’),” rather than at the “Crown’s pleasure (‘durante
beneplacito’)”).
42. MASS. CONST. art. XXIX, pt. I (1780).
43. PA. CONST. § 23 (1776) (“The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have fixed
salaries, be commissioned for seven years only, though capable of re-appointment at the end of
that term, but removable for misbehaviour at any time by the general assembly.”); N.J. CONST.
art. XII (1776) (“[T]he Judges of the Supreme Court shall continue in office for seven years: the
Judges of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas in the several counties, Justices of the Peace,
Clerks of the Supreme Court, Clerks of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas and Quarter
Sessions, the Attorney-General, and Provincial Secretary, shall continue in office for five years.”).
44. See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5 (“Justices of the supreme court shall hold office during good
behavior.”).
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supreme court justices may serve until age 70.45 All other states have
term limits (generally 6-14 years), although judges can often be
reappointed or re-elected.46
In sum, although the original source material is not especially dense,
one certain conclusion clearly emerges: The Framers had a single
overriding concern, and that concern was judicial independence. They
adopted a means of safeguarding that independence—the good
behavior clause—already used in several states. The evidence, in short,
is not that the Framers believed the good behavior clause had any
specific meaning, or that it was tantamount to life tenure, but simply
that they regarded this standard as one that would insure political
insulation of the judicial branch.
Given the attention paid to confirmation of judges today, especially
Supreme Court justices, it might seem strange that the Framers
discussed judicial tenure and the meaning of good behavior so little.47
The best explanation for this inattention to what is now such an
important matter is that the Framers shared Hamilton’s view that the
judiciary was the “least dangerous” branch.48 Federal question
jurisdiction was not explicitly conferred until the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, and the notion of judicial activism (illustrated, for
example, by the creation of substantive due process, which elicits such
strident contemporary debate) did not yet exist. In light of the care and
specificity with which the Framers treated Congress and the Executive
(e.g., including minimum age qualifications and specific terms of
office), it seems more likely that the Framers were relatively
unconcerned with the length of judges’ tenure because the judicial
branch was not all that powerful—not that life tenure itself carried
inherent value.
Even Hamilton’s well-known The Federalist No. 78 is less a fullthroated endorsement of life tenure than an embrace of judicial
independence, and furthermore, the importance of a judicial check on
45. MASS. CONST. art. XCVIII, pt. I (1780); N.H. CONST. art. 78 (1776).
46. State Supreme Courts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts
(last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
47. By way of contrast, the Framers spent considerable time on the issue of compensation.
The delegates initially planned to prohibit both decreases and increases to judicial salaries, but
Gouverneur Morris suggested permitting increases in pay–a suggestion initially opposed by
Madison, who worried that the power to increase salaries could lead to undue influence over the
judicial branch by Congress. Ultimately, Morris’s argument prevailed, and Article III does not
preclude increases in judicial compensation.
48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from the nature
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution . . . .”).
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the political branches. As he said concerning the good behavior
standard
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the
judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the
modern improvements in the practice of government. In a
monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in
a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient
which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws.49

But despite the judiciary’s important role as a counterweight to the
political branches, it was inconceivable even to Hamilton that judges
would play the role they have come to play. As he argued, judges “can
take no active resolution whatever” and “depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”50 Hamilton’s view
of judicial impotence was obviously myopic, but that very myopia
serves to explain why he and the Framers in Philadelphia simply did
not devote much serious thought to the matter of judicial tenure.
IV. DOES ELIMINATING LIFE TENURE FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?
We set out to address whether Congress may lawfully enact term
limits for Supreme Court justices, without the need to formally amend
Article III. The answer to that question turns on whether the good
behavior clause necessitates life tenure, absent some specific incident
of “bad” behavior (whatever this might mean).51 Further, insofar as the
good behavior clause aims to foster certain institutional characteristics
of Article III judges, we have identified two specific data points as
relevant to determining whether life tenure facilitates those
characteristics. The first is the length Supreme Court justices now serve
(as compared to how long the Framers could reasonably have

49. Id.
50. Id. Limits on the power of Article III judges to act are well known and include the caseor-controversy requirement and limits on justiciability including standing, ripeness, and mootness
doctrines. The literature on justiciability and its limitations is vast. For a starting point, see
generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1963); Alexander M.
Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For a more recent defense of
robust justiciability doctrine, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996).
51. See supra note 27.
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anticipated they would serve); and the second is the increasing
ideological polarization on the Court.
We can now answer our question by evaluating the significance of
these two data points in light of six distinct propositions that emerge
from the historical materials we have examined. The first three of these
propositions rest on incontestable historical evidence; the second three
of which are nearly as certain.
First, the Framers in Philadelphia spent relatively little time
addressing judicial tenure. Second, while the Framers did not expressly
embrace life tenure for Article III judges, there are several indications
that they believed the good behavior clause would beget that very
result. Third, they simultaneously adopted the good behavior standard
not because it would mean life tenure, but because it would mean the
judicial branch would retain independence from the political branches.
That independence was the critical trait that the Framers intended the
judicial branch to exhibit.
Fourth, the justices on the Supreme Court serve lengthier terms
now than they did in the earlier periods of U.S. history. Fifth, the
polarization on the Court is demonstrably more acute than it was in
earlier periods. And sixth, judicial independence can more easily be
achieved by a term of years than it can by the good behavior standard.
Of these propositions, the third, fifth, and sixth are the most crucial.
The third is important because it captures the original purpose of
including the good behavior clause in Article III: judicial independence.
The fifth suggests that the Supreme Court is increasingly not
independent of the political branches, because justices are neither
nominated nor confirmed unless they exhibit a deep ideological affinity
with a given political ideology.52 Indeed, to the extent that the good
behavior clause originally aimed at safeguarding independence, and
insofar as justices are increasingly not in fact independent, that dearth
of independence implies that they are not exhibiting good behavior.
Finally, term limits for Supreme Court justices, provided the lengths of
those terms are of sufficient duration, would achieve at least the same
degree of judicial independence accomplished by life tenure, without
the accompanying cost of life tenure.
The key originalist fact is this: What the Framers sought to
accomplish with the good behavior clause was judicial independence.

52. Lee, supra note 31, at 37–43.
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Even if life tenure once achieved that objective, it no longer does so.
On the contrary, life tenure, coupled with increased judicial
polarization, entrenches political ideology in the Article III courts. In
terms of insulating the judicial branch from ordinary politics, term
limits could not fare any worse than life tenure, and there are therefore
compelling policy reasons, grounded in originalism, for Congress to
enact such limits.
Moreover, an act of Congress imposing such limits might well be an
act of ordinary legislation no one would have standing to challenge.53 It
is also possible a congressional interpretation of the good behavior
clause would be a political question not subject to review by an Article
III court.54 But putting these justiciability issues aside, if term limits are
desirable, and a term that could maintain (or achieve) judicial
independence could be agreed on, a committed originalist could
embrace such a statute.
APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, BY ERA OF APPOINTMENT
Note: Justices marked with an * served until their deaths. * denotes
a justice who served up to 10 years before dying; *(1) denotes a justice
who served 11-20 years before dying; *(2) denotes a justice who served
21–30 years before dying; *(3) denotes a justice who served more than
30 years before dying.
1. Founding Era, 1787–1810.
* James Wilson: He joined the Court at age 47 in 1789 and served
for 8 years until his death in 1798.
John Jay (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 43 in 1789 and
served for 5 years until his retirement in 1795.
John Blair: He joined the Court at age 58 in 1790 and served for 5
years until his resignation in 1795.
53. Addressing the issue of whether anyone would have standing to challenge term limits is
beyond the scope of our analysis here, but it is by no means clear that anyone would suffer a
concrete and particularized injury necessary to support constitutional standing. Indeed, even
under the theory of so-called society rights one of us has advocated, it is not certain anyone would
have standing to challenge a law enacting a term of years, because the societal right could be
deemed to be an independent judge, rather than a judge who serves for life. See generally David
R. Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195 (1987) (arguing for citizen standing to vindicate
so-called societal rights, i.e., those that, when abridged, necessarily impose a widely shared, nonparticularized injury). There may be prudential standing barriers implicated as well. For an
overview, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 (2d ed., 1994).
54. Addressing whether interpreting the good behavior clause involves a political question
is likewise beyond the scope of our analysis here.
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*(1) William Cushing: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1790 and
served for 20 years until his death in 1810.
John Rutledge (interim chief justice): He joined the Court at age 50
in 1790 and served for 1 year until his resignation in 1791 to serve on a
South Carolina court. He had previously served as Governor of South
Carolina. President Washington re-appointed him to the Supreme
Court as Chief Justice in 1795, but the Senate refused to confirm him.
He did serve as interim Chief Justice for four months and remains the
only justice to serve by “recess appointment.”
* James Iredell: He joined the Court at age 38 in 1790, appointed by
President George Washington. He served for 9 years until his death in
1799.
Thomas Johnson: He joined the Court at age 59 in 1792, appointed
by President George Washington. He served for less than one year
until his resignation in 1793 due to health issues.
*(1) William Paterson: He joined the Court at age 47 in 1793,
appointed by President George Washington. He served for 13 years
until his death in 1806.
*(1) Samuel Chase: He joined the Court at age 54 in 1796,
appointed by President George Washington. He served for 15 years
until his death in 1811.
Oliver Ellsworth (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 50 in
1796, appointed by President George Washington. He served for 4 years
until his resignation in 1800 due to health issues.
*(3) Bushrod Washington: He joined the Court at age 36 in 1798,
appointed by President John Adams. He served for 31 years until his
death in 1829.
Alfred Moore: He joined the Court at age 44 in 1800, appointed by
President John Adams. He served for 3 years until his resignation in
1804.
*(3) John Marshall (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 45 in
1801, appointed by President John Adams. He served for 34 years until
his death in 1835.
*(3) William Johnson: He joined the Court at age 32 in 1804,
appointed by President Thomas Jefferson. He served for 30 years until
his death in 1834.
*(1) Henry Brockholst Livingston: He joined the Court at age 49 in
1807, appointed by President Thomas Jefferson. He served for 16 years
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until his death in 1823.
*(1) Thomas Todd: He joined the Court at age 42 in 1807, appointed
by President Thomas Jefferson. He served for 18 years until his death
in 1826.
2. The Jacksonian Era, 1810–1840.
Gabriel Duvall: He joined the Court at age 58 in 1811, appointed by
President James Madison. He served for 23 years until his resignation
in 1835 due to hearing loss.
*(3) Joseph Story: He joined the Court at age 32 in 1812, appointed
by President James Madison. He served for 33 years until his death in
1845.
*(2) Smith Thompson: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1823,
appointed by President James Monroe. He served for 20 years until his
death in 1843.
* Robert Trimble: He joined the Court at age 49 in 1826, appointed
by President John Quincy Adams. He served for 2 years until his death
in 1828.
*(1) Henry Baldwin: He joined the Court at age 50 in 1830,
appointed by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 14 years until
his death in 1844.
*(3) John McLean: He joined the Court at age 45 in 1830, appointed
by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 31 years until his death in
1861.
*(3) James M. Wayne: He joined the Court at age 45 in 1835,
appointed by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 32 years until
his death in 1867.
*(2) Roger B. Taney (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 59 in
1836, appointed by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 28 years
until his death in 1864.
* Philip P. Barbour: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1836, appointed
by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 4 years until his death in
1841.
*(2) John Catron: He joined the Court at age 51 in 1837, appointed
by President Andrew Jackson. He served for 28 years until his death in
1865.
*(1) John McKinley: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1838,
appointed by President Martin Van Buren. He served for 14 years until
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his death in 1852.
3. Civil War and Reconstruction, 1840–1870.
*(1) Peter V. Daniel: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1842,
appointed by President Martin Van Buren. He served for 18 years until
his death in 1860.
*(2) Samuel Nelson: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1845,
appointed by President John Tyler. He served for 27 years until his
retirement in 1872.
* Levi Woodbury: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1845, appointed
by President James K. Polk. He served for 5 years until his death in
1851.
Robert C. Grier: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1846, appointed
by President James K. Polk. He served for 23 years until his retirement
in 1870.
Benjamin R. Curtis: He joined the Court at age 41 in 1851,
appointed by President Millard Fillmore. He served for 5 years until his
resignation in 1857. (Notably, he resigned due to a conflict with Chief
Justice Taney about the famous Dred Scott case.)
John A. Campbell: He joined the Court at age 41 in 1853, appointed
by President Franklin Pierce. He served for 8 years until his resignation
in 1861. (His status as a Southerner at the beginning of the Civil War
essentially forced him to resign from the Court, even though he
opposed secession and advocated against it.)
*(2) Nathan Clifford: He joined the Court at age 53 in 1858,
appointed by President James Buchanan. He served for 23 years until
his death in 1881.
Noah Swayne: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1862, appointed by
President Abraham Lincoln. He served for 18 years until his retirement
in 1881.
*(2) Samuel F. Miller: He joined the Court at age 46 in 1862,
appointed by President Abraham Lincoln. He served for 28 years until
his death in 1890.
*(1) David Davis: He joined the Court at age 47 in 1862, appointed
by President Abraham Lincoln. He served for 14 years until his
resignation in 1877.
Stephen J. Field: He joined the Court at age 46 in 1863, appointed
by President Abraham Lincoln. He served for 34 years until his
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retirement in 1897.
* Salmon P. Chase (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 56 in
1864, appointed by President Abraham Lincoln. He served for 8 years
until his death in 1873.
4. The Technological Revolution, 1870–1900.
* William Strong: He joined the Court at age 61 in 1870, appointed
by President Ulysses S. Grant. He served for 10 years until his
retirement in 1880. (Notably, he retired while still in good health, partly
to send a message to other ailing justices who were reluctant to step
down.)
*(2) Joseph P. Bradley: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1870,
appointed by President Ulysses S. Grant. He served for 21 years until
his death in 1892.
Ward Hunt: He joined the Court at age 63 in 1873, appointed by
President Ulysses S. Grant. He served for 9 years until his retirement
due to disability in 1882.
*(1) Morrison R. Waite (chief justice): He joined the Court at age
57 in 1874, appointed by President Ulysses S. Grant. He served for 14
years until his death in 1888.
*(3) John Marshall Harlan (Harlan I): He joined the Court at age
44 in 1877, appointed by President Rutherford B. Hayes. He served for
33 years until his death in 1911.
* William B. Woods: He joined the Court at age 56 in 1881,
appointed by President Rutherford B. Hayes. He served for 6 years
until his death in 1887.
* Stanley Matthews: He joined the Court at age 56 in 1881,
appointed by President James A. Garfield. He served for 7 years until
his death in 1889.
*(2) Horace Gray: He joined the Court at age 53 in 1882, appointed
by President Chester A. Arthur. He served for 20 years until his death
in 1902.
*(1) Samuel Blatchford: He joined the Court at age 62 in 1882,
appointed by President Chester A. Arthur. He served for 11 years until
his death in 1893.
* Lucius Q.C. Lamar: He joined the Court at age 62 in 1888,
appointed by President Grover Cleveland. He served for 5 years until
his death in 1893.

DOW & MEHTA_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

114

3/17/2021 6:41 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

*(2) Melville W. Fuller (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 55
in 1888, appointed by President Grover Cleveland. He served for 21
years until his death in 1910.
*(2) David J. Brewer: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1890,
appointed by President Benjamin Harrison. He served for 20 years
until his death in 1910.
* Henry B. Brown: He joined the Court at age 54 in 1891, appointed
by President Benjamin Harrison. He served for 15 years until his
retirement in 1906.
George Shiras, Jr: He joined the Court at age 60 in 1892, appointed
by President Benjamin Harrison. He served for 10 years until his
retirement in 1903.
* Howell E. Jackson: He joined the Court at age 60 in 1893,
appointed by President Benjamin Harrison. He served for 2 years until
his death in 1895.
*(2) Edward D. White (chief justice): He joined the Court as an
associate justice at age 48 in 1894, appointed by President Grover
Cleveland. In 1910, he was promoted to Chief Justice by President
William Howard Taft. He served until his death in 1921. Justice White
served on the Court for 27 years, including 10 years as Chief Justice.
*(1) Rufus Peckham: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1896,
appointed by President Grover Cleveland. He served for 13 years until
his death in 1909.
Joseph McKenna: He joined the Court at age 54 in 1898, appointed
by President William McKinley. He served for 26 years until his
retirement in 1925.
5. World War I Era, 1900–1930.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr: He joined the Court at age 61 in 1902,
appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt. He served for 29 years
until his retirement in 1932.
William R. Day: He joined the Court at age 53 in 1903, appointed
by President Theodore Roosevelt. He served for 19 years until his
retirement in 1922.
William H. Moody: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1906, appointed
by President Theodore Roosevelt. He served for 3 years until his
retirement due to disability in 1910.
* Horace H. Lurton: He joined the Court at age 65 in 1910,
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appointed by President William Howard Taft. He served for 4 years
until his death in 1914.
Charles E. Hughes (chief justice): He initially joined the Court at
age 48 in 1910, appointed by President William Howard Taft. He served
for 5 years but resigned in 1916 to run for President. He rejoined the
Court as Chief Justice in 1930, appointed by Herbert Hoover, and
served for 11 years until his retirement in 1941.
Willis Van Devanter: He initially joined the Court at age 51 in 1911,
appointed by President William Howard Taft. He served for 26 years
until his retirement in 1937.
* Joseph R. Lamar: He initially joined the Court at age 53 in 1911,
appointed by President William Howard Taft. He served for 4 years
until his death in 1916.
Mahlon Pitney: He joined the Court at age 54 in 1912, appointed by
President William Howard Taft. He served for 10 years until his
resignation due to disability in 1922.
James C. McReynolds: He joined the Court at age 52 in 1914,
appointed by President Woodrow Wilson. He served for 26 years until
his retirement in 1941.
Louis D. Brandeis: He joined the Court at age 49 in 1916, appointed
by President Woodrow Wilson. He served for 22 years until his
retirement in 1939.
John H. Clarke: He joined the Court at age 59 in 1916, appointed by
President Woodrow Wilson. He served for 5 years before resigning in
1922.
William Howard Taft (chief justice): He joined the Court at age 63
in 1921, appointed by President Warren G. Harding. He served for 8
years until his retirement in 1930. He had previously been President of
the United States and remains the only U.S. Supreme Court Justice to
have also been President.
George Sutherland: He joined the Court at age 60 in 1922,
appointed by President Warren G. Harding. He served for 15 years until
his retirement in 1938.
*(1) Pierce Butler: He joined the Court at age 56 in 1923, appointed
by President Warren G. Harding. He served for 16 years until his death
in 1939.
*(1) Edward T. Sanford: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1923,
appointed by President Warren G. Harding. He served for 7 years until
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his death in 1930.
*(2) Harlan Fiske Stone (chief justice): He joined the Court at age
52 in 1925, appointed by President Calvin Coolidge. In 1941, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted him to the Chief Justice position,
which he retained until his death in 1946. Justice Stone served on the
Supreme Court for 21 years total, including 4 years as Chief Justice.
6. World War II and the New Deal, 1930–1960.
Owen J. Roberts: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1930, appointed
by President Herbert Hoover. He served for 15 years until his
resignation in 1945.
* Benjamin N. Cardozo: He joined the Court at age 61 in 1932,
appointed by President Herbert Hoover. He served for 6 years until his
death in 1938.
Hugo L. Black: He joined the Court at age 51 in 1937, appointed by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 34 years until his
retirement in 1971 due to stroke.
Stanley Reed: He joined the Court at age 53 in 1938, appointed by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 19 years until his
retirement in 1957.
Felix Frankfurter: He joined the Court at age 56 in 1939, appointed
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 23 years until his
retirement due to stroke in 1962.
William O. Douglas: He joined the Court at age 40 in 1939,
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 36 years
until his retirement in 1975 due to stroke.
* Frank Murphy: He joined the Court at age 49 in 1940, appointed
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 9 years until his
death in 1949.
* James F. Byrnes: He joined the Court at age 59 in 1941, appointed
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 1 year before
resigning in 1942.
*(1) Robert H. Jackson: He joined the Court at age 49 in 1941,
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 13 years
until his death in 1954.
* Wiley B. Rutledge: He joined the Court at age 48 in 1943,
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He served for 6 years
until his death in 1949.
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Harold Burton: He joined the Court at age 57 in 1945, appointed by
President Harry S. Truman. He served for 13 years until his retirement
in 1958.
* Fred M. Vinson (chief justice): He joined the Court as Chief
Justice at age 56 in 1946, appointed by President Harry S. Truman. He
served for 7 years until his death in 1953.
Tom C. Clark: He joined the Court at age 49 in 1949, appointed by
President Harry S. Truman. He served for 17 years until his retirement
in 1967.
Sherman Minton: He joined the Court at age 58 in 1949, appointed
by President Harry S. Truman. He served for 7 years until his retirement
in 1956 due to poor health.
Earl Warren (chief justice): He joined the Court as Chief Justice at
age 62 in 1953, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He
served for 15 years until his retirement in 1969.
John Marshall Harlan (Harlan II): He joined the Court at age 55 in
1955, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He served for 16
years until his retirement in 1971.
William J. Brennan: He joined the Court at age 50 in 1956,
appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He served for 33 years
until his retirement in 1990 due to health issues.
Charles E. Whittaker: He joined the Court at age 56 in 1957,
appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He served for 5 years
until his retirement due to disability in 1962.
Potter Stewart: He joined the Court at age 43 in 1958, appointed by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He served for 22 years before retiring
in 1981.
7. Civil Rights and the Space Age, 1960–1990.
Byron R. White: He joined the Court at age 44 in 1962, appointed
by President John F. Kennedy. He served for 31 years until his
retirement in 1993.
Arthur J. Goldberg: He joined the Court at age 54 in 1962,
appointed by President John F. Kennedy. He served for 2 years until his
resignation in 1965.
Abe Fortas: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1965, appointed by
President Lyndon B. Johnson. He served on the Court for 3 years until
his resignation in 1969.
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Thurgood Marshall: He joined the Court at age 59 in 1967,
appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson. He served for 23 years until
his retirement in 1991.
Warren E. Burger (chief justice): He joined the Court as Chief
Justice at age 61 in 1969, appointed by President Richard Nixon. He
served for 17 years until his retirement in 1986.
Harry A. Blackmun: He joined the Court at age 61 in 1970,
appointed by President Richard Nixon. He served for 24 years until his
retirement in 1994.
Lewis F. Powell: He joined the Court at age 64 in 1972, appointed
by President Richard Nixon. He served for 15 years until his retirement
in 1987.
*(3) William H. Rehnquist (chief justice): He joined the Court at
age 47 in 1972, appointed by President Richard Nixon. In 1986,
President Ronald Reagan promoted him to the Chief Justice position,
which he held until his death in 2005. Justice Rehnquist spent 33 years
on the Court, including 18 years as Chief Justice.
John Paul Stevens: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1975, appointed
by President Gerald Ford. He served for 34 years until his retirement
in 2010.
Sandra Day O’Connor: She joined the Court at age 51 in 1981,
appointed by President Ronald Reagan. She served for 24 years until
her retirement in 2006.
*(2) Antonin Scalia: He joined the Court at age 50 in 1986,
appointed by President Ronald Reagan. He served for 29 years until
his death in 2016.
Anthony M. Kennedy: He joined the Court at age 51 in 1988,
appointed by President Ronald Reagan. He served for 30 years until
his retirement in 2018.
8. Internet and Pandemic, 1990–2020.
David H. Souter: He joined the Court at age 51 in 1990, appointed
by President George H.W. Bush. He served for 18 years until his
retirement in 2009.
Clarence Thomas: He joined the Court at age 43 in 1991, appointed
by President George H.W. Bush. As of March 2021, he has served for
29 years.
*(2) Ruth Bader Ginsburg: She joined the Court at age 60 in 1993,
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appointed by President Bill Clinton. She served for 27 years until her
death in 2020.
Stephen Breyer: He joined the Court at age 55 in 1994, appointed
by President Bill Clinton. As of March 2021, he has served for 26 years.
John Roberts (chief justice): He joined the Court as Chief Justice at
age 50 in 2005, appointed by President George W. Bush. As of March
2021, he has served for 15 years.
Samuel A. Alito: He joined the Court at age 55 in 2006, appointed
by President George W. Bush. As of March 2021, he has served for 15
years.
Sonia Sotomayor: She joined the Court at age 55 in 2009, appointed
by President Barack Obama. As of March 2021, she has served for 11
years.
Elena Kagan: She joined the Court at age 50 in 2010, appointed by
President Barack Obama. As of March 2021, she has served for 10
years.
Neil Gorsuch: He joined the Court at age 49 in 2017, appointed by
President Donald Trump. As of March 2021, he has served for 3 years.
Brett Kavanaugh: He joined the Court at age 53 in 2018, appointed
by President Donald Trump. As of March 2021, he has served for 2
years.
Amy Coney Barrett: She joined the Court at age 48 in 2020,
appointed by President Donald Trump. As of March 2021, she has
served for less than one year.

